Abstract. Switching costs may facilitate monopoly pricing in a market with price competition between two suppliers of a homogenous good, provided the switching cost is above some critical level. It is also well known that asymmetric size of customer bases makes monopoly pricing more difficult. Adding consumer heterogeneity to the model we demonstrate that also composition of each firm's customer base affects pricing, and this composition may aggravate or ease the incentives to break out of the monopoly pricing equilibrium.
Introduction
Firms often compete in markets for more or less homogeneous goods, with prices as the main strategic variable. There are different sources of market power under such circumstances, and one such source is the existence of switching costs: the fact that even if consumers don't care about which product they start to buy, there may be costs associated with switching suppliers. Such costs dampen competition in mature markets in a variety of settings, as shown by Paul Klemperer in numerous articles (see his 1995 survey). In particular, if all consumers have positive switching costs, the only possible price equilibrium in pure strategies is monopoly pricing, and such an equilibrium exists if and only if the switching costs exceed some critical level.
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the extent to which existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is affected by asymmetries between the firms. Already Klemperer (1987) noticed that the critical switching cost may depend on the relative size of the firms. In particular, size asymmetry make monopoly pricing less likely. 1 The critical switching cost may also be affected by heterogeneity of consumer preferences.
2 Moreover, heterogeneity among consumers also give rise to another possible asymmetry between the firms: they may have different compositions of their customer bases. In what follows we will study the effects of each kind of asymmetry and how they blend.
In addition to the already mentioned literature on switching costs, many scholars have studied non-linear pricing in more or less competitive settings. With the exception of Gabrielsen and Vagstad (2003) , all these contributions model other sources of market power than switching costs. Wilson (1993, Part 12. 3) consider Cournot competition, while Stole (1995) , Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) study situations with differentiated products.
To our knowledge, none has studied the joint effects of size and consumer type composition asymmetries on duopoly pricing. We model a situation in which there are two types of consumers, H (high-demand) and L (low-demand), and two firms who have split the market some way or another in a first period that is not modelled. All consumers have a common positive cost of switching supplier, implying that there is only one candidate for Nash equilibrium in pure strategies: monopoly pricing (defined as the contracts the two firms would offer if they were monopolists in their respective parts of the market). It turns out that absent any economies or diseconomies of scale, size does not matter for pricing, provided a pure-strategy equilibrium exists. Only the relative numbers of high vs. low-demand consumers within each firm's customer base matter for pricing. However, both size and composition matters for existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium. Our main result is that each type of asymmetry tends to increase the switching cost needed for existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium, but that one source of asymmetry may or may not counteract the effect of the other, primarily depending on whether it is the smaller or larger firm who has the largest share of high-demand consumers in its customer base.
We should be concerned about existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium for two reasons. First, the alternative to the proposed equilibrium involving monopoly pricing by both firms is an equilibrium in which each firm draws tariffs from a distribution ranging from competitive pricing to monopoly pricing, with lower profits as an inevitable result. Second, market shares and compositions are not entirely exogenous to the firms, but depend on actions taken in earlier periods.
Since we advocate size and composition symmetry, and, in the absence of size symmetry, a certain pattern of composition asymmetry, we provide a link between market composition on the one hand and outcomes (prices, profits) on the other.
The paper proceeds as follows. The basic model is presented in Sect. 2. Under the assumption that there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium, equilibrium pricing is studied in Sect. 3. Section 4 gives a general discussion of issues related to existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and presents our results, while some concluding remarks are gathered in Sect. 5. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
The model
Consider two firms -A and B -setting prices in a market with two kinds of consumers -H ("high" demand) and L ("low" demand). There are a total of l low-demand consumers and h high-demand consumers in the market. The two firms offer functionally identical products, but each consumer has already bought from one of the firms, and if a consumer wants to switch to the other supplier, switching costs are incurred. Firm i's number of customers are denoted h i and l i , respectively. We assume that all consumers have identical positive switching costs denoted s. In particular, the costs of switching does not depend on a consumer's demand volume. Next, we assume that each firm offers a menu of contracts, one intended for each type of consumer (as is well known, in a static model with only two types, it suffices to study menus with only two tariffs). With only two types of customers, little is lost by restricting attention to point contracts, that is, contracts of the form M i = (q i , T i ) where q i is quantity and T i is payment.
Consumer preferences are described by the following quasi-linear utility function:
where θ is the consumer's "type", q is demand volume and T is monetary payment for the good in question. In line with the literature (see e.g., Wilson 1993, Sect. 6.2) it is assumed that U q > 0, U< 0, U θ > 0 and U qθ > 0, where subscripts denote partial derivatives. That is, the marginal utility of the good in question is positive at a decreasing rate; utility is increasing in the consumer's type (which is just a normalization); and marginal utility is increasing in the consumer's type. As noted above we will restrict attention to situations with only two consumer types, i.e., θ ∈ {L, H}. Firms are allowed to be asymmetric as regards customer bases, while costs are symmetric, for simplicity normalized to zero. 
Equilibrium mechanism
As long as all consumers have positive switching costs, s > 0, Klemperer (1987) has argued -in a framework of linear pricing -that if there is a pricing equilibrium in pure strategies, in this equilibrium each firm prices as if it has monopoly power over its locked-in customers. The argument goes as follows. At any lower common price than the monopoly price, each firm has an incentive to slightly increase its price, in order to exploit its own customers without losing any to its competitor. Even "small" switching costs suffice to make the (possible) equilibrium switch from competitive pricing to monopoly pricing. Note that the logic of small deviations applies equally well to situations involving non-linear pricing: even if firm A uses linear prices, it would pay for firm B to price non-linearly, for instance using two-part tariffs. However, the proposed equilibrium may be vulnerable to non-marginal price changes: a sufficiently large price cut will make one firm corner the market, and if the switching costs are small, cornering the market becomes so attractive that monopoly pricing is not an equilibrium either -implying that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies at all.
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In this section we simply assume that there exists an equilibrium in pure strategies and proceed to characterize this equilibrium, while the issue of existence is relegated to Sect. 4. Hence, consider a monopoly firm which have in its customer base from the first period a number l i of low-demand customers and h i high-demand customers. Moreover, we restrict attention to situations involving internal equilibria in which both types of consumers are served by both firms. Technically, this requires that the group of low-demand consumers must be sufficiently important in terms of demand (e.g. as measured by L/H) and numbers (e.g. as measured by
denote the maximum utility a consumer of type θ can obtain when exposed to mechanism
subject to the standard incentive and participation constraints:
Note that this formulation of the monopolist's problem also captures situations in which it is optimal not to sell to low-demand consumers. Such a solution is obtained
The assumptions made about preferences implies that (4) and (5) are redundant, while (3) and (6) bind for the optimal contract. The solution depends on the numbers of the two types of customers and will be denoted (M *
For subsequent reference to the case in which a firm prices as if it has the entire market, we also define the information rents of monopoly customers v *
H . Moreover, monopoly pricing will be used to refer to the mechanism chosen by such a firm:
The optimal contract exhibits the well-known characteristics; no distortion of the high-demand type's quantity and downward distortion of the low-demand type's quantity. Moreover, the low-demand customers earn no rent whereas the highdemand customers may earn an information rent:
. Finally, the distortion imposed on the low-demand customers is increasing in the relative number of high-demand customers. The reason is that the more high-demand customers the more important they are, and to extract more rent from the high-demand customers you must distort the lowdemand contract to make it unattractive for the high-demand customers. Formally,
Existence of pure-strategy equilibria
As already mentioned, in a pure strategy equilibrium each firm behaves as if it is a monopolist in the submarket consisting of their locked-in customers. That is, the only candidate for pure-strategy equilibrium is to have
Clearly, the existence of this proposed equilibrium depends on the switching cost s. First, it should be clear that in equilibrium, incentive constraints must hold across firms. Since low-demand customers earn no rent from either firm, they have nothing to gain (and an amount s to loose) from switching firm. Some high-demand customers, on the other hand, may benefit from switching, if the difference in the two firms' high-demand customers' information rent exceeds the switching cost. To prevent such "accidental switching," the following must therefore apply:
Constraint (7) prevents high-demand customers of firm i to take the mechanism intended for firm j's high-demand customers, while constraint (8) prevents highdemand customers of firm i to take the mechanism intended for firm j's low-demand customers. Constraint (8) is implied by constraints (7) and (6) and is therefore redundant, while (7) holds if s is large or if the firms are rather symmetric. However, even if (7) is satisfied, the proposed equilibrium may not be sustained, due to intentional undercutting. In fact, (7) will never bind in equilibrium, simply because if high-demand customers of one of the firms are on the brink of switching supplier at the proposed equilibrium prices, the other firm can cheaply poach all these highdemand customers by reducing prices marginally. Consequently, it suffices to study conditions under which the firms do not want to undercut each other intentionally.
To find the critical switching costs needed to sustain the proposed equilibrium we need to derive optimal undercutting strategies for the firms. There are three types of undercutting behavior, depending on whether the undercutting firm wants to poach all the rival's customers (to be dubbed strategy all), only the rival's high-demand customers (strategy high) or only his low-demand customers (strategy low). However, with type-independent switching costs, strategy low is always dominated by strategy all, leaving us with two undercutting strategies to consider: high and all.
Our main concern is how asymmetries in either firm size or customer composition affect existence of the pure-strategy equilibrium, that is, the size of the critical switching costs needed to sustain a pure strategy equilibrium that involves monopoly pricing. First, consider size asymmetry. Proposition 1 generalizes to general nonlinear mechanisms the above-mentioned result first proved by Klemperer (1987) : Proposition 1. Pure size asymmetry increases the critical switching cost.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The intuition is straightforward: if firms are equal in size and composition, both firms face the same incentive to undercut. Suppose then that the firms have identical composition of customers, but that one firm is larger than the other, where size is measured by a firm's total number of customers. Intuitively, the smaller firm now will have higher incentive to undercut than if firms are symmetric in every respect, simply because the potential gain from undercutting is larger the more customers you get when cutting prices. This intuition applies whichever undercutting strategy the small firm uses. Hence, size asymmetry should make the smaller firm more aggressive which will destabilize the market: higher switching costs is needed to sustain monopoly prices than in a perfectly symmetric setting. Now consider composition asymmetries. The first thing to notice regarding composition asymmetries is that, given that a pure strategy equilibrium exists, more asymmetry tends to increase industry profit:
Proposition 2. Whenever a pure strategy equilibrium exists, industry profit is minimized for symmetric composition.
In the pure-strategy equilibrium, the two firms set prices independently. If they have the same composition of customers, they will both price as if they were monopolists, yielding industry profit equal to the monopoly profit. If composition is different, they may still set the monopoly mechanism, and if they choose something different it is because it increases profit, i.e., a revealed preference argument. Another way to interpret the result is that composition asymmetries enable firms to specialize in rent extraction from the group of customers that is most important to each firm, thereby improving the monopoly mechanism. A firm that has relatively many low-demand customers will distort low-demand contracts relatively less, and in this way extract more rent from low-demand customers at the expense of leaving more rent to high-demand customers. Similarly, the firm who has relatively more high-demand customers will distort low-demand contracts relatively more in order to extract more rent from high-demand customers. Thinking about complete asymmetry -full specialization -makes the argument obvious. This will facilitate efficient contracts and full rent extraction of all customers.
Next consider asymmetric composition of customer bases. From a situation where firms have symmetric composition of customer bases (but possibly different size), suppose that firm A swaps low-demand customers for a number of high-demand customers in a way that leaves his profit unchanged. Some important properties of firm A's critical switching cost after such a swap is then described by the following Lemma: 
The first part of the lemma, i.e., inequality (9), dealing with strategy high, has a simple interpretation: When ε > 0, firm A receives high-demand consumers from B in return for giving away low-demand consumers. By definition, his equilibrium profit is unaffected by this change. His profit from undercutting his rival decreases -and so does the switching cost needed to prevent this type of undercuttingfor two reasons. First, his rival's high-demand consumers are less numerous than before. Second, since firm B's high-demand consumers after the swap become under-represented in firm B's customer base (compared to the average), they will be offered a contract leaving them an information rent that is higher than v * H . This makes each of them more difficult (i.e., expensive) to attract than before the swap.
The last two lines of the lemma -dealing with strategy all -are slightly more difficult to understand. Firm A's problem when undercutting this way is similar to the monopolist's problem, with the low-demand consumers'participation constraint tightened by s. Offering all consumers the monopoly mechanism M * θ (l, h) plus an amount s to cover the switching cost is the best firm A can get away with. This contract is enough to attract firm B's high-demand consumers only if they had an initial contract (being firm B's customers) leaving them a rent not exceeding v * H . As argued above, firm B's high-demand consumers will be more difficult to attract whenever ε > 0, while they will accept the proposed contract (monopoly contract plus s) if ε < 0. In the latter case neither the equilibrium profit nor the profit from using strategy all depend on ε, consequently, the critical switching cost does not either (equation (10)). In contrast, if ε > 0 the profit when undercutting decreases (due to the added difficulties attracting firm B's high-demand consumers) and so does the critical switching cost (inequality (11)).
Two propositions can now be derived from Lemma 1: Proof. In the Appendix.
Proposition 3. With full symmetry initially (l A = l B and h
A = h B , implying k = 1 2 ),
a profit neutral swap of customers will increase the critical switching cost if s

Proposition 4. With initial size asymmetry
(k < 1 2 but l A h A = l B h B
), a profit neutral swap of customers may have any effect on the critical switching cost: it may increase (if s
Proposition 3 essentially states that a pure composition asymmetry will, if anything, contribute to a higher critical switching cost. That is, this type of asymmetry may only make a pure-strategy equilibrium more difficult to sustain. Proposition 4, in contrast, opens for another possibility: if there is already a size asymmetry, the right kind of composition asymmetry may to some extent mitigate the problems of sustaining the pure-strategy equilibrium arising from the size asymmetry.
Concluding remarks
There are different sources of market power when price-setting firms compete in a market for homogeneous products. We have studied one such possibility -the creation of consumer switching costs -in a market with heterogeneous consumers. We have earlier (Gabrielsen and Vagstad 2003) argued that consumer heterogeneity tends to increase the critical switching cost needed to make a pure-strategy equilibrium involving monopoly pricing exist. This has the immediate implication that the more heterogeneity, the higher efforts firms will dedicate to raise barriers for consumers who may want to switch supplier. The aim of these activities is to preserve monopoly pricing and thereby protect monopoly rents.
While Gabrielsen and Vagstad (2003) restricted attention to symmetric duopoly, the present paper has opened for firm asymmetries. We have shown that pure size asymmetry increases the critical switching cost. Moreover, we have shown that pure composition asymmetry increases or leave unchanged the critical switching cost. Furthermore, we have shown that composition asymmetry increases industry profits whenever the pure-strategy equilibrium exists. Finally, there are mixed results from blending size and composition asymmetries: the critical switching cost may increase, decrease or remain constant as consumers are swapped in a profit-neutral way, depending mostly on the direction of asymmetries: the critical switching cost is decreased if the smaller firm has a larger share of the high-demand consumers. However, the combined effect also depends on the form of the temptation. In particular, if it is most tempting to try to attract the entire market, then the critical switching cost is not increased if the smaller firm gives up some high-demand consumers in exchange for low-demand ones.
In future work we would also like to extend our analysis in two other ways. First, we wish to study the interplay between the second-period effects on the critical switching cost studied in the present paper, and the competition for (different types of) customers in the first period. Such an extension could build heavily Paul Klemperer's earlier work (see e.g. his 1995 survey). Second, we would also like to know how things change if we allow for more dynamics, e.g. by allowing for tacit collusion in addition to the switching costs studied here. Beggs and Klemperer (1992) and Padilla (1995) have studied the interplay between switching costs and the scope for reaching a collusive agreement in a repeated version of simpler pricing games, and an extension could take these contributions as starting points.
where k is firm A's market share, π A (k) is firm A's profit, and π M is the monopoly profit as defined in Sect. 3. Firm A may be tempted to cut prices to attract all his rival's customers (strategy all) or go for his high-demand customers only (strategy high).
First suppose he considers strategy all. He must then pay the new consumers their switching costs, which amounts to choosing the mechanism (M L , M H ) that maximizes
If we for a moment disregard constraint (15), this problem is identical to the monopolist's problem described in Sect. 3 except that low-demand customers' participation constraint is tightened by an amount s. Since consumer utility is linear in money, such a change will not affect optimal quantities, only payment. Consequently, the solution entails reducing the payment in both contracts offered by the same amount s. Then we immediately see that the omitted constraint (15) is satisfied (with equality). Consequently, the undercutting firm gets profit given by
To prevent firm A from undercutting in this way, the following must hold:
By symmetry, to prevent firm B (having a market share of 1 − k) from undercutting in this way,
Consequently, the larger a firm is, the less tempted to undercut. When the market is split evenly between them, they are both equally tempted, while asymmetries make the smaller firm more aggressive and the larger firm less aggressive. What counts for equilibrium existence, however, is that the most tempted firm becomes more aggressive as we increase the asymmetry:
which is minimized for k = 1 2 . Next suppose that firm A instead consider to go for his rival's high-demand consumers only, strategy high. Then he maximizes denote the corresponding profit. Note first that as s increases, constraint (25) becomes tighter, while nothing happens to the other constraints or with the objective function. Moreover, when s > 0 constraint (25) is binding for the optimal undercutting mechanism. As a consequence, the maximum value of the objective function must be decreasing in s. Formally, ∂π high (s, k)/∂s < 0.
To prevent firm A from using strategy high, the switching cost must be sufficiently high. Formally, the critical switching cost needed to prevent this type of undercutting, s A high , is defined by (k) . Its derivative is given by (using the implicit function theorem) > 0. Consequently, the larger a firm is, the less tempted it is to undercut also for this particular strategy. When the market is split evenly between them, they are both equally tempted, while asymmetries make the smaller firm more aggressive and the larger firm less aggressive. What counts for equilibrium existence is again that the most tempted firm becomes more aggressive as we increase the asymmetry:
a function that reaches its minimum for k = 1 2 . What remains is to put both strategies together. To prevent any kind of undercutting, the following must hold:
As both s all (k) and s high (k) increases with asymmetries and is minimized for k = 1 2 , the maximum of the two must exhibit the same property. Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is essentially one of revealed preferences. First note that with symmetric composition, both firms will price as if they were monopolists. That is, both choose the monopoly pricing mechanism M * L (l, h), M * H (l, h) as defined in Sect. 3. The industry profit is then the monopoly profit π M defined in Sect. 3. When there are asymmetries, both firms may still price as if each of them were a monopolist serving the entire market. Then the industry profit will still equal the monopoly profit π M . Either firm may choose to deviate from monopoly pricing, however, and if they do so, it is because it increases profits. Consequently,
for at least one of the firms i ∈ {A, B} and one of the customer types θ ∈ {L, H}, then it must be the case that industry profit exceeds π M . That is, industry profit is minimized for symmetric composition.
Proof of Lemma 1. To prevent undercutting with strategy high,
where maximization is performed over the set of mechanisms {(M L , M H )} that are incentive compatible as well as individually rational for the intended consumers (all high-demand and firm A's low-demand consumers). Note the slight abuse of notation, as π high has earlier been defined as a function of only s and k. Also note that the number ε does not enter the LHS. Changing ε has a first order impact on the RHS (in addition there is an effect on the choice of optimal mechanism, but this effect is of second order). Since the critical switching cost σ A high is defined by
it follows (using the implicit function rule) that
A high < 0 for the same reasons that ∂π high (s, k)/∂s < 0 when composition were symmetric (cf. the proof of Proposition 1).
Next consider strategy all. Suppose ordinary incentive and participation constraints suffice for the undercutting firm (what is left out is the constraint securing that firm B's high-demand consumers are satisfied with firm A's offer -this will be checked below), who then makes the same profit as if the initial composition were symmetric (from the proof of Proposition 1). Consequently, to prevent firm A from undercutting in this way, s ≥ s
What remains is to check whether the omitted constraint is satisfied or not, that is, whether the proposed contract is good enough for firm B's high-demand consumers to make them switch. This depends on how satisfied they are with the status quo. If firm B has relatively few high-demand consumers, less distortions are imposed on the firm's low-demand consumers in order to extract information rent from these high-demand consumers, who will then receive much information rent. This means that for ε > 0, an ordinary monopoly contract with paid switching costs is insufficient to make them switch: they need more, and this make undercutting less tempting, consequently, ∂σ 
